The State of Utah v. Dennis Wayne Shuffler : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
The State of Utah v. Dennis Wayne Shuffler : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Robert C. Lunnen; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for the
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Paul R. Frischknecht; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Shuffler, No. 920360 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3306
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEAlW 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
DENNIS WAYNE SHUFFLER, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case ^||P2:DT5D-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment of itjin| 
Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpl 
Honorable David L. Mower, Jiadl 
PAUL R. 
Attorney 
Appellan 
50 North 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
ROBERT C. LUNNEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff-
Appellee 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1016 
bounty 
;::HKNECHT (1129) 
Defendant-
- • "I IT J I M » I r i S t r e e t 
Manti , U t k | | a 4 642 
Telephony klllKiO l) 8 3 5-4 3 9 I 
Argument 
from com 
c r i m i n a l 
Lori ty: (2) Appeals 
prions in a l l o t h e r 
I t e r s . 
mm COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
% IF U 
50 
amm NO, 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 3 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 3 
STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 10 
POINT I 10 
POINT II 12 
CONCLUSION 18 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
People v. Duran. 188 Colo. 207, 533 P.2d 1116 (1975) . . . . 14 
People v. Edwards. 198 Colo. 52, 598 P.2d 126 (1979) . . 15, 16 
People v. Strong. 190 Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966 (1976) . 12-14, 18 
State v. Fierro. 101 Ariz. 118, 416 P.2d 551 (1966) 13 
State v. Gerrard. 584 P. 2d 885 (Utah 1978) 3, 4, 12 
State v. Harris. 585 P.2d 451 (Utah 1978) 3, 4 
State v. Hawk. 97 Idaho 1, 539 P.2d 553 (1975) 12 
State v. Jolivet. 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986) 3, 4, 12 
State v. Ledbetter. 83 Idaho 451, 364 P.2d 171 (1961) . . . . 12 
State v. Lee. 656 P.2d 443 (Utah 1982) 16, 17 
State v. Linebarger. 71 Idaho 255, 232 P.2d 669 (1951) . . . 12 
State v. Pickard. 105 Ariz. 219, 462 P.2d 87 (1969) 12 
2 
State v. Shelbv. 728 P.2d 987 (Utah 1986) 12 
State v. Weise. 75 Idaho 404, 273 P.2d 97 (1954) 12 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-310 (6) (1990 Repl.) 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990 Repl.) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1992) 10, 11, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990 Repl.) 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1992) 3 
3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Ann. (1992). This 
is an appeal from final judgment, dated May 28, 1992, of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
Notice of Appeal was filed June 4, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO 
CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT'S HISTORY, CHARACTER AND 
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS WHEN IT ENTERED JUDGMENT SENTENCING THE 
DEFENDANT TO NINE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF NOT LESS THAN ONE OR 
MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Upon conviction of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea, 
the matter of sentencing rests within the discretion of the trial 
court, within the limits prescribed by law. An appellate court 
may reverse or modify a sentence which is prescribed by law if it 
is clearly excessive or if the trial court abused its discretion. 
State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978); State v. Harris. 585 
P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1978). 
ISSUE II 
IS THE SENTENCE CLEARLY EXCESSIVE CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY 
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSES AND THE HISTORY, 
CHARACTER, AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS OF THE DEFENDANT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Upon conviction of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea, 
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the matter of sentencing rests within the discretion of the trial 
court, within the limits prescribed by law. An appellate court 
may reverse or modify a sentence which is prescribed by law if it 
is clearly excessive or if the trial court abused its discretion. 
State v. Jolivet. 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978); State v. Harris, 585 
P.2d 451, 453 (Utah 1978). 
STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Annotated 
Section 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences -
Limitations. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs 
of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive 
sentences. 
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 
76-1-401. 
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate 
maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 3 0 years7 
imprisonment. However, this limitation does not apply if an 
offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death 
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one 
offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more 
offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition of 
sentence for any one or more of them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state 
other than the present sentencing court or by a court of 
another state or federal jurisdiction. 
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and 
the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons 
shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a 
single term that shall consist of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
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(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 3 0-year 
limitation the maximum sentence is considered to be 30 
years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the 
minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the 
validly imposed minimum terms, 
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to 
run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently 
being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the greater 
and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences 
are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence with 
the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number 
or length of individual sentences that may be imposed or to 
affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit 
the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority 
of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
DENNIS WAYNE SHUFFLER, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 920360-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Sixth 
Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah. The 
defendant, Dennis Wayne Shuffler, plead guilty to six counts of 
unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-513 (1990 Repl.), and three counts of diverting or 
appropriating insurance funds, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-310(6) 
(1990 Repl.). All nine counts were second degree felonies. A 
sentencing hearing was held April 29, 1992. (Transcript of 
Sentencing Proceeding, hereinafter "Tr.", at 40). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the sentencing hearing the trial court sentenced the 
defendant to serve a term of one to fifteen years on each of the 
nine counts and ordered that the terms be served consecutively. 
(Judgment, hereinafter "J.", at 1). The court also ordered the 
defendant to pay full restitution to all victims and imposed a 
7 
fine of ten thousand dollars on each count, the fine to be 
suspended on successful payment of full victim restitution. (J. 
at 2) • 
The court further ordered the revocation of any licenses 
issued to the defendant by the state of Utah to act as an 
insurance agent or broker or any licenses which permit the 
defendant to act in a fiduciary capacity. The court required 
that, during the term of the defendant's parole, the defendant 
not be allowed to act in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of any 
individual or corporation or act in any capacity which requires 
him to have control or possession of another person's money or 
property. (J. at 2). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONSIDER 
THE DEFENDANT'S HISTORY, CHARACTER AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS WHEN 
IT ENTERED JUDGMENT SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO NINE CONSECUTIVE 
TERMS OF NOT LESS THAN ONE NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON. 
Statute mandates that a trial court consider the history, 
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. The trial 
court failed to consider these factors and made no findings in 
the record concerning the defendant's history, character or 
rehabilitative needs. The trial court abused its discretion 
because it imposed consecutive sentences without considering the 
factors mandated by statute. 
II, THE SENTENCE IS CLEARLY EXCESSIVE CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSES AND THE HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND 
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a sentence which is 
within the limits prescribed by law may be reversed or modified 
if it is clearly excessive or if the trial court abused its 
discretion. An extraordinarily long sentence, even though within 
the limits set by statute, must be justified by evidence in the 
record or it will be overturned. The court must consider the 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant along with the seriousness 
of the crime and the need to protect the public. 
The defendant in the case at bar is a prime candidate for 
rehabilitation. He is well educated, has no criminal record, and 
fully cooperated with the state in the investigation of the 
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crime. The crimes for which he was convicted involved no 
violence and the public safety does not require that the 
defendant, a non-violent criminal, be confined. The public can 
be fully protected by other provisions of the sentence. The 
sentence imposed in this case was the maximum possible sentence 
and it is not justified by the evidence in the record. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
DEFENDANT'S HISTORY, CHARACTER AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS WHEN IT 
ENTERED JUDGMENT SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO NINE CONSECUTIVE 
TERMS OF NOT LESS THAN ONE NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS IN THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON. 
The trial court abusea its discretion by imposing on the 
defendant a sentence of nine consecutive terms of not less than 
one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. In a 
case such as this, where the defendant has been convicted of more 
than one felony offense, the trial court must determine whether 
to impose consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences run 
concurrently unless the trial court determines that they should 
run consecutively. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1992). The 
statute mandates that ff [a] court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to 
impose consecutive sentences." Id. at § 76-3-401(2)(emphasis 
added). The trial court ignored this mandate when it sentenced 
Mr. Shuffler to nine consecutive terms, which, in the words of 
the court, is the "maximum penalty". (Tr. at 41). 
There is nothing in the transcript of the sentencing hearing 
nor in the court's written order which indicates that the trial 
court considered the factors mandated by statute. The basis for 
the trial court's determination that the sentences should run 
consecutively rather than concurrently seems to have been the 
11 
court's conclusion that Mr. Shuffler is not a trustworthy person. 
The court stated, M[f]rom what I have seen in the* presentence 
report and what I had heard from you today leads me to conclude 
that you are not a trustworthy person." (Tr. at 41). The court 
continued, lf[s]o for that reason . . . I intend to impose the 
maximum penalty against you and I do do that." (Tr. at 42). 
Admittedly, the crimes committed by Mr. Shuffler are 
serious. In addition to the seriousness of the crimes, however, 
the court is required to consider the circumstances of the crimes 
and the history, character and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant in fashioning an appropriate sentence. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401(2). A finding that the defendant is not trustworthy 
is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute. 
It is impossible to divine the basis for the trial court's 
decision unless the court makes specific findings, either orally 
or in writing, which explain and justify that decision. The 
record in this case is void of any findings made by the trial 
court as to the history and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. Absent such findings, it cannot be assumed that the 
trial court made its sentencing determination based on these 
statutorily mandated factors. The trial court abused its 
discretion by imposing consecutive terms without considering 
these factors. Therefore, the sentence should be overturned or 
modified. 
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POINT II 
THE SENTENCE IS CLEARLY EXCESSIVE CONSIDERING THE GRAVITY AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OP THE OFFENSES AND THE HISTORY, CHARACTER, AND 
REHABILITATIVE NEEDS OF THE DEFENDANT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a sentence which is 
within the limits prescribed by law may be reversed or modified 
if it is clearly excessive or if the trial court abused its 
discretion. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1978)(citing State v. Pickard, 105 Ariz. 219, 462 P.2d 87 (1969); 
People v. Strong, 190 Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966 (1976); State v. 
Hawk, 97 Idaho 1, 539 P.2d 553 (1975)). This is true even though 
the matter of sentencing rests within the discretion of the trial 
court. See State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986). 
A similar rule is followed in other states. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated, "when this court has found that there 
has been an abuse of discretion in sentencing, it has not 
hesitated to exercise its power to review in that regard to 
reduce the sentences imposed." State v. Hawk, 97 Idaho 1, 539 
P.2d 553 (1975). See, e.g., State v. Ledbetter, 83 Idaho 451, 364 
P.2d 171 (1961)(thirty-year sentence for lewd and lascivious 
conduct reduced to fifteen years); State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404, 
273 P.2d 97 (1954) (maximum term of imprisonment and fine for 
involuntary manslaughter found to be excessive); State v. 
Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255, 232 P.2d 669 (1951)(twenty-year 
sentence for rape reduced to a term not to exceed five years). 
Arizona courts have also held that a sentence which is 
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appropriate under the applicable statute will be revised if it 
clearly appears to be excessive. See, e.g., State v. Fierro, 101 
Ariz. 118, 416 P.2d 551 (1966)(sentence for robbery held to be 
excessive considering the defendant's youth and rehabilitative 
needs). 
Mr. Shuffler plead-guilty to nine second degree felonies 
each of which are punishable by an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than 15 years. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203(2) (1990 Repl.). Although the sentence is within the limits 
prescribed by law, it is excessive and an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion when evaluated in light of the circumstances 
of the crime and the history and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
Mr. Shuffler's case can be compared to People v. Strong, 190 
Colo. 189, 544 P.2d 966 (1976). In that case the defendant plead 
guilty to robbery and was sentenced to the maximum allowable 
term. Appellate review of his sentence was guided by Colorado 
law which, like the Utah Statute, required the court to consider 
the nature of the offense and the possibility of rehabilitating 
the defendant and also required the court to "attempt to work out 
a fair accommodation between the need to protect society at large 
and to deter potential offenders, to punish the convicted 
offender, and to rehabilitate him". Id^f at 967. The Colorado 
Supreme Court also required that "[a]ny imposition of the maximum 
or close to the maximum penalty must be supported by sound 
reasons in the record for . . . xa sentence that is too long tends 
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to reinforce the criminal tendencies of the convicted 
defendant. ,lf Id. at 967-68 (quoting People v. Duran, 188 Colo. 
207, 533 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1975). 
The defendant in Strong had a minimal level of education and 
had held no steady job. He had a prior conviction for burglary 
and there was evidence that he was a drug addict. On the other 
hand, the offense involved no aggravating circumstances and the 
defendant's record did not demonstrate involvement with violent 
crimes nor would it support the conclusion that he was a hardened 
criminal without hope for rehabilitation. The court concluded 
that the sentence was excessive and must be reduced because 
11
 [w]hile being punished, appellant's opportunities for 
rehabilitation will be enhanced by a reduction in the sentence 
imposed, and this . . . may be accomplished here without eroding 
the underlying societal need, that of protecting the public 
interest." Id., at 968. 
Similarly, Mr. Shuffler's opportunities for rehabilitation 
will be enhanced by a reduction in the sentence imposed. In fact 
he is a more likely candidate for rehabilitation than the 
defendant in Strong. Unlike the defendant in Strong, Mr. 
Shuffler is well educated and has been steadily employed. (Tr. 
at 8). Like the defendant in Strong, Mr. Shuffler has had no 
involvement with violent crimes. A review of Mr. Shuffler's 
record shows that he has no previous felony or misdemeanor 
convictions; he is not a hardened criminal without hope for 
rehabilitation. Mr. Shuffler is a prime candidate for 
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rehabilitation based on his education and past record. 
It is also important"to note that Mr. Shuffler's sentence 
could be reduced while still protecting the public interest. 
Public safety does not require that Mr. Shuffler, a nonviolent 
criminal, be confined. The public is adequately protected by the 
provisions of the sentence which revoked his insurance licenses 
and prohibited him from acting in a fiduciary capacity. (See, J. 
at 2). There are no sound reasons in the record which support 
the imposition of the maximum penalty. 
The case at bar can also be compared to People v. Edwards, 
198 Colo. 52, 598 P.2d 126 (1979). In Edwards, the defendant was 
convicted of three felony counts of selling drugs. The trial 
court sentenced him to ten to fourteen years on each count, the 
sentences on the first two counts to run concurrently and the 
third count to run consecutively. On appeal the state supreme 
court emphasized that "[a]lthough sentencing is a discretionary 
function of a trial judge, a consecutive sentence resulting in an 
extraordinarily long prison term must be supported by evidence in 
the record justifying the trial judge's action." Id., at 129. 
Review of sentencing must take into account the purposes of 
criminal sanction including deterrence, rehabilitation and 
punishment and the statutory mandate to consider the nature of 
the offense, the character of the offender and the public 
interest. Id. 
In Edwards, the forty-two year old defendant had no felony 
convictions and no misdemeanor convictions within the five years 
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immediately preceding the charges. He had dropped out of high 
school but completed his high school education and earned one 
year of college credit while in the United States Air Force. The 
court concluded, considering the seriousness of the crime, that 
the sentences were not so severe as to amount to an abuse of 
discretion. The court also concluded, however, that there was no 
support in the record for the trial court to require the third 
sentence to be served consecutively. This conclusion was based 
on the fact that the defendant had never engaged in violent 
conduct or threatened to inflict bodily injury on anyone and the 
fact that the trial judge had expressly stated that the 
defendant's rehabilitation was of no concern. Id. at 130. 
In the case at bar, as in Edwards, there is no support in 
the record for the trial court to require that the sentences on 
all nine counts be served consecutively. There is no evidence 
which justifies the extraordinarily long sentence. Mr. 
Shuffler's crimes were not violent and they did not involve 
threat of bodily harm. In addition, the trial court failed to 
consider Mr. Shuffler's past record and rehabilitative needs when 
it imposed the consecutive sentences and abused its discretion by 
failing to make findings as to these factors. The excessive 
sentences which resulted from this abuse of discretion should be 
overturned. 
The case at bar is different from State v. Lee, 656 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1982), where the Utah Supreme Court considered a challenge 
to a consecutive sentence. The defendant in Lee was convicted 
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for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated 
assault. The trial court determined that the three sentences 
should run consecutively rather than concurrently. On appeal the 
defendant contended that the sentencing court did not apply the 
guidelines found in section 76-3-401(2) of the Utah Code. This 
section, as set forth above, requires the court to consider the 
gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (1992): The Utah Supreme Court found the 
consecutive sentences fully justified under the statute. Id., at 
444. 
The defendant in Lee was apprehended after a violent crime 
spree in which he stole three different cars, took a hostage at 
gunpoint, breached a roadblock, shot one police officer and fired 
at several others. As to the defendant's character and 
rehabilitative possibilities, the Adult Probation Report 
contained a "history of chronic [and] continuous offenses." Id. 
Mr. Lee's sentence was fully justified, considering the gravity 
and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Id. 
The circumstances surrounding Mr. Shuffler's crimes, as well 
as his character and history, make the case at bar very different 
from Lee. Mr. Shuffler's education and work history show that he 
has great rehabilitative possibilities. The record shows that 
Mr. Shuffler was very cooperative with the attorney general's 
office during the investigation of the case. At the sentencing 
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hearing the prosecutor noted how helpful Mr. Shuffler had been 
and commented, "I haven't had this kind of cooperation in the 
past from a defendant." (Tr. at 5.) 
A long sentence may sometimes be justified by the depravity 
of the crime for which the defendant has been convicted or where 
the defendant's past record reveals repeated convictions such 
that the public safety can only be assured if the offender is 
confined. The need for a maximum sentence is clear where a 
hardened criminal commits a vicious crime. Strong, 544 P.2d at 
967. There is no evidence in the record which justifies the 
extraordinarily long sentence imposed on Mr. Shuffler. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider 
the defendant's history character and rehabilitative needs. The 
sentence imposed is clearly excessive and should be reversed or 
modified. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul R. Frisctiknecht 
Attorney for Appellant 
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the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid thereon, this /^) day of 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS WAYNE SHUFFLER, 
Defendant. 
J U D G M E N T 
Criminal No. 921600021 
Judge David L. Mower 
The above-captioned matter came on for Sentencing on 
the 29th day of April, 1992, the Defendant having previously 
entered pleas of guilty to nine (9) second degree felonies. The 
Court having read the presentence report; having heard the 
statements of Robert C. Lunnen for the State of Utah, Paul R. 
Frischknecht, Attorney for Defendant, and the statement of 
Defendant, Dennis Wayne Shuffler; and being aware of no further 
impediment to entry of Judgment; 
NOW THEREFORE, for the above criminal offenses, all of 
which are second degree felonies, the Defendant is sentenced to 
serve a term of one (1) to fifteen (15) years on each of the nine 
(9) counts charged in the Information, and that all nine counts 
5GMENT ENTERED 
DGMENT DOCKET 
? If P«fA -5" 
shall be served consecutively. Defendant shall pay .full 
restitution to all victims, including, but not limited to those 
victims listed in the Statement of Defendant, which has been 
executed and filed into the court record. Defendant shall pay a 
fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) on each count charged. 
The Court will suspend the fine upon successful payment of full 
victim restitution. 
XT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any insurance licenses held 
by the Defendant, which have been issued by the State of Utah to 
act as an insurance agent or broker, or any licenses issued by 
the State which permit Defendant to act in a fiduciary capacity, 
are hereby revoked. 
XT 18 FURTHER ORDERED that during the term of 
Defendant's parole, he shall not act in a fiduciary capacity on 
behalf of any individual or corporation, nor shall he act in any 
capacity which requires him to have the control or possession of 
another persons money or property. 
DATED this •2-1 _ day of fllttf , 1992. 
day of 
Dav^i^KL. Mower 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED as to form for presentment and fJWLing this 
1992. 
vkaj 'L. <=*£tx^t,JL,j.j 
Panl R. Frisptlk&echt 
Lticfrnex £or defendant 
* / 
Robert C. Lunnen 
Assistant Attorney General 
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for six months and it's now time for action. And I'm just 
anxious to get on with it. Let's get it done. And I 
respect you for whatever decision you would come up with, so 
that's basically it, 
COURT ORDER 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shuffler is here because 
he's convicted of nine second degree felonies. Six of them 
are unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, and three 
of them are diversion of appropriation of insurance funds. 
There's no minimum time required for any of those. The 
maximum fine that could be imposed is $10,000, plus a 25 
percent surcharge, which was the surcharge in effect for at 
least part of the time. I'm not sure how many started with 
the 25 percent surcharge, but I think I'm gonna take care of 
that by not imposing it just so we don't have any problems 
*dth that. 
As to the unlawful dealing with property by a 
fiduciary, Mr. Shuffler, you're sentenced to serve 1 to 15 
years in the Utah State,Prison for each of those offenses, 
six counts. That's six sentences to the Utah Stat© Prison, 
1 to 15 yuars; 
Diversion of appropriation of insurance funds, 
you «,. -entenced to serve 1 to 15 years in the Utah State 
prison for earh of those counts. That's three second degree 
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felonies. 
MR. SHUFFLER: Um-hm. 
THE COURT: You're also ordered to pay a line or 
$10,000 on each count. The fine will include.any surcharge 
that was in effect at the time the offenses were committed: 
You're ordered to pay restitution to each of the 
victims in this case; and that means any victim, whether 
8II named in one of the nine counts or not. I do not, at this 
9 point, determine the amount of restitution because I'm not 
io in possession of sufficient evidence to determine the amount 
u of restitution. 
12 I am required to make a decision about the 
13 sentences and whether they run consecutively or 
14 concurrently. The sentences will run consecutively, Mr. 
13 Shuffler. I am intending to impose the maximum penalty and 
,6 I do impose the maximum penalty, as I can. And I want to 
17 explain to you the reason why I do that, for your benefit 
18 II and for the benefit of the victims. 
19 From what I have seen in the presentence report 
20 and what I have heard from you today leads me to conclude 
2i thai, you are not a trustworthy person. And the glue that 
22 binds a community together is the belief that we all have 
23 that we can trust each other and that most people will be 
24 obedient, and you violated that trust on behalf of these 
25 people who are here today. 
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1 And what you've told me about your bankruptcy 
2 proceedings concerns me because you're telling me that you 
3 have not been honest with the Bankruptcy Court. And you're 
4 required to do that in order to get a surcharge from the 
5 Bankruptcy Court and your comments lead me to believe that 
6 II you're still not a trustworthy person, in spite of what's 
7 happened to you so far. So for that reason, I'm intending 
8 t o — I intend to impose the maximum penalty against you and I 
9 do do that. I recognize that that does not give a lot of 
io opportunity for. older victims to ever receive any 
n restitution from you, and when I'm faced with the choice 
12 between how to get money out of you and how to get 
13 punishment out of you, I suppose I choose the punishment 
u because not only did you take money—money can be replaced, 
15 but trust can't be replaced, and I think that's the big 
16 violation that you made was the violation of trust that 
171| people, had in you. 
18 The Board of Pardons will have authority over you 
l? <o decide not only how much time you spend in prison, but 
20 tlw amount of restitution. The Board of Pardons will 
21 COIIUU-..! a restitution hearing. 
22 Mr. Lunnen, I need to make sure,that the Board of 
23 PurJons knows the names and addresses of each of the 
24 victims. T don't know whether that information ought to be 
2$ in the,.order that I sign, the commitment order or the 
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judgment, because then that information may get wider 
circulation than it ought to get. But the Board of Pardons 
needs to know that information. What do you suggest about 
that? 
MR. LUNNEN: Your Honor, I believe the Board of 
Pardons will have access to the presentence report. 
THE COURT: But I—but I'm just seeing names on 
the presentence report. T don't know that I saw addresses. 
I know the Board of Pardons sends letters to the victims. 
MR. LUNNEN: AP&P does also have all the names and 
addresses of all the victims. 
THE COURT: I know the Board of Pardons sends 
letters to victims, prior to each parole hearing, prior to 
restitution hearings. 
MR. LUNNEN: Yes, they do. 
THE COURT: But of course, they can't do that if 
they don't have the information. It's—so it's important 
for them to have the information. 
MR. LUNNEN: What we'll do is we'll make sure that 
AP&P gives all the names and addresses of the victims to the 
Boaju* of Pardons for their use. I'll contact Mr. Mullin and 
Mr. Murray in the nature that they give that information to 
Lho Board of Pardons. 
THE COURT: I need you to include in the order, 
Mr. Lunnen, language that I request that the Board of 
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Pardons, in fashioning any parole order for Mr. Shuffler, 
that they impose as a condition of parole that he not be 
allowed to be licensed u/ith any kind of a license that 
allows him to act as a fiduciary or to handle other people's 
money. 
I also want to do one other thing, which I hope 
will be helpful to the cause of restitution and that's this. 
If restitution can be paid within the period of parole, then 
that restitution money will count as full payment of fines 
and restitutions so the fines will be suspended if the 
restitution is paid. 
T give you that incentive, Mr. Shuffler, to try 
and get the restitution paid. I fined you $90,000—9 times 
$10,000—so you can save that much money by paying 
institution within the period of parole. It may be small 
incentive. I don't know how you're gonna do it, but you 
seem to have high confidence, and if you do, wonderful. I 
h>»l'8 you gut it done. 
MR. SHUFFLER: What shall I do? Just give up? 
THE COURT: Yqu can't give up. It's true. 
MR. SHUFFLER: Just remember, I told you so. 
THE COURT: And I'd be delighted to have you prove 
me wrong. I would just be delighted. 
MR. SHUFFLER: I would be delighted to do it, so 
we'll work at it. 
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THE COURT: I hope you can. And maybe what I'm 
doing, maybe the way I'm speaking is in the nature of 
throwing down the gauntlet for you, to say, "Okay. Prove me 
wrong. See what you can do." 
MR. SHUFFLER: Well, it's up to me anyway, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: I'd be delighted to,have you prove me 
wrong. 
Mr. Lunnen what else should we do that we haven't 
done today? 
MR. LUNNEN: I think we've covered everything, 
Your Honor. I'll draft an order for your review and I'll 
also send a copy to Mr. Frischknecht. 
THE COURT: What we need quickly is a commitment 
order and you probably don't have a form that you could fill 
out right now. 
MR. LUNNEN: No. I do not. 
THE COURT: But the Sheriff is gonna want a 
commitment order as his authority to transport Mr. Shuffler. 
Can you g*t with the Coqnty Attorney's office while you're 
here and while I'm here and at least get ,a commitment order 
done before the day is out? 
MR. LUNNEN: I will. 
THE COURT: It will be very short of just saying 
that you should commit him to the custody of the Sheriff and 
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1 the Department of Corrections for nine consecutive 1 to 
2 15-year terms. 
3 II Mr. Frischknecht, what else can you think of that 
4 we should do today that we haven't done? 
5 || MR. FRISCHKNRCHT: Your Honor, would the Court 
6 II consider, in light of that sentence, that he have a day or 
7 two to take care of some things he needs to do that he 
81| ccviously won't be able to do for a long time? 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Lunnen, any reaction to that? 
io |l MR. LUNNEN: Your Honor, I have to be truthful in 
n saying that Mr.Shuffler has appeared for all his court 
12 appearances. I can't say that he's been reluctant to be 
13 here or has tried to run. He's been here in the community 
14 years and years and years and has stayed here during this 
15 whole ordeal, and so I really have no basis to object. I'm 
16 || a little cautious for Mr. Shuffler's safety. 
17 THE COURT: Is he on his recognizance now? 
18 MR. LUNNEN: Yes. He is. 
19 THE COURT: No bond posted. 
20 MR. LUNNEN: No bond. 
21 THE COURT: Why are you worried about his safety? 
22 MR. LUNNEN: I think the reality of this case is 
23 Ll.« reality that he is sentenced to nine consecutive terms 
24 is tJi^t certainly it's gonna have a negative mental 
25 PX ' wlogical impact upon Mr. Shuffler. I'm worried about 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-401 
or affected by the conviction, by advertising in designated areas, or by desig-
nated media or otherwise. 
(2) When an executive or high managerial officer of a corporation or associ-
ation is convicted of an offense committed in furtherance of the affairs of the 
corporation or association, the court may include in the sentence an order 
disqualifying him from exercising similar functions in the same or other cor-
porations or associations for a period of not exceeding five years if it finds the 
scope or willfulness of his illegal actions make it dangerous or inadvisable for 
such functions to be entrusted to him. 
History; C. 1953, 76-3-303, enacted by L. 
1973. oh. 196, i 76-3-303. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Kev Numbers. — Criminal Law +• 1206(1). 
PART 4 
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON 
SENTENCES 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limita-
tions. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than1 one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sen-
tences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently 
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determin* 
ing whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
^ (4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
Sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years1 imprisonment. However, this 
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of 
them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdic-
tion. 
(6), In determining the effect or consecutive sentences and the manner in 
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons shall treat the defendant as 
though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
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(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the 
maximum sentence is considered to b£ 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7; 
1969, ch. 181, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24,1989, deleted "Subject 
to the limitations of Subsections (2) through 
(5)" at the beginning of Subsection (1); inserted 
"for state offenses" in the second sentence in 
Subsection (1); rewrote the first sentence in 
Subsection (4) which read "If a court lawfully 
determined to impose consecutive sentences, 
the aggregate minimum of all sentences im-
posed may not exceed twelve years' imprison-
ment and the aggregate maximum of all sen-
tence imposed may not exceed thirty years' 
imprisonment"; inserted "a maximum sentence 
of before "life imprisonment" at the end of the 
second sentence in Subsection (4); rewrote Sub-
section (6) following "single term" which read 
"witft the following incidents, (a) The prison 
term shall consist of the aggregate of the val-
idly imposed prison terms; and (b) The mini-
tauKV t»rra> if any> ah&ll catxatitute tbe aggre-
gate of the validly imposed minimum terms"; 
added Subsections (8) and (9); and made nu-
merous stylistic changes throughout the sec-
tion. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Commencement of second sentence, 
Consecutive sentences. 
Sentences imposed by different states. 
Commencement of second sentence. 
Sentence upon conviction of second offense 
could not begin later than termination of first; 
court properly sentenced defendant to serve ad-
ditional five years on conviction of perjury, to 
commence upon expiration of life sentence 
which defendant was already serving. State v. 
Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967). 
Consecutive sentences. 
The court did not err in imposing consecutive 
sentences on the defendant for the crimes of 
aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault, 
even though both were committed in the course 
of a single criminal episode, where the evi-
dence clearly showed that a sufficiently sub-
stantial period of time had elapsed, both before 
and after the sexual assault, in which the vic-
tim was restrained against her will and sub-
jected to a substantial risk of harm from the 
defendant's threats and loaded gun. State v. 
Joiivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986). | 
Trial court did not err in imposing four con-
secutive sentences for second-degree murder, 
attempted murder and two counts of aggra-
vated assault arising out of a barroom alterca-
tion, because defendant committed four sepa-
rate and distinct crimes involving different vic-
tims- State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
Sentences imposed by different states. 
Subsection (1), providing that sentences are 
to run concurrently unless the court states to 
the contrary in the sentence, does not apply to 
sentences imposed by two different sovereigns, 
and, therefore, such sentences should run con-
secutively unless the sentencing court ex-
pressly directs otherwise. State v. Reed, 709 
P,2d 391 (Utah 1985). 
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